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Summary 
In this report we examine the excess use of Temporary Parental Benefit for 
parents who need to stay home from work when their children are sick. This 
study is based on a randomized experiment that took place during the spring 
2006. The method used is rather new and more ambitious than those used in 
similar studies in the past. One advantage with this more elaborate technique is 
that a larger part of the veiled excessive use can be discovered. The result 
points to that as much as 22.5 percent of the costs for this social insurance are 
due to excess use. There are significant gender differences; women’s excess 
use amounts to 19 percent of their total use while the corresponding figure for 
men is 28 percent. 
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1  Introduction 
Of the Swedish public social security systems – the Social Insurance Agency, 
the unemployment insurance and the local social service – together expends up 
to 500 billion SEK yearly in social allowances and benefits.
1 This is equivalent 
to one sixth of the national GDP. The importance to secure that the right 
benefit goes to the right individual at the right point in time is therefore 
considerable. This report accounts for the result from a study that aims to 
measure possible excess use of one of Sweden’s benefit system, i.e. the 
Temporary Parental Benefit. 
To measure the excess use of this benefit, we have used a fairly innovative 
technique, the information method. Instead of the usual randomized monitoring 
of benefit use, certain individuals have been informed in advance that they are 
subjects to increased monitoring. The individuals that have been informed 
about this inspection are randomly chosen from the population that is entitled 
to this benefit. Since these individuals receive information about their (poten-
tial) future withdrawal being exposed to monitoring, their average withdrawals 
are expected to decrease. In other words, we expect that those who were using 
the benefit excessively now adjust their patterns of withdrawal, at least 
temporarily, to be in line with what the rules prescribes. Since the information 
concerning increased inspections was not sent out to everyone entitled to the 
benefit, one could expect a difference in the withdrawal pattern, between the 
group who got and those who did not get the information. This difference can 
be treated as an indirect measure of excess use. One important condition is of 
course that those who use the benefit excessively see “the threat” of increased 
monitoring as credible.  
Actual monitoring of the withdrawals has been carried out during the 
period, just as the letter informed. The results of the actual monitoring provides 
an indirect measure of the efficiency of the information letter; if everyone who 
received the letter discontinues their potential excess use of the benefit, no one 
will get caught when monitored. Jointly, the change in withdrawal patterns (the 
information effect) and the result from the monitoring in itself can be used to 
obtain a full measure of general excess use of the benefit.  
 
1 $1 ≈ 7 SEK.  
The Temporary Parental Benefit constitutes, for a number of reasons, a 
suitable choice for this type of study. One reason is that this benefit has been 
explored in earlier studies, in terms of excess use. Therefore, it is possible to 
compare the results from this study with earlier results in order to compare the 
different methods. In addition, the formal rules tied to this particular benefit are 
relatively uncomplicated and easy to grasp; the main condition is of course that 
the child in question has to be home sick and the caretaker has to be home from 
work. In case one or both of those conditions fail, it would be hard to claim 
unawareness of the rules tied to the benefit. Our evaluation is therefore that in 
almost all cases of excess use, the person involved knows that he or she is 
breaking the rules. And this constitutes a most central quality in order for the 
results, stemming from the information method, to be easily interpretable.  
This project was commissioned by the Government appointed delegation 
against incorrect payments in the social security system (the FUT-Delegation). 
It has been carried out in collaboration with IFAU and the Swedish Social 
Insurance Agency (Försäkringskassan). 
1.1  Briefly on the Temporary Parental Benefit and the 
limits of the study. 
The Temporary parental benefit contains three separate benefits; income 
insurance when a parent or caretaker has to stay at home from work in order to 
look after a sick child (we denote this with its Swedish abbreviation VAB from 
now on), a number of days in connection to child birth (paternity leave), and 
“contact days”, when parents can visit their children’s school or participate in 
parental education. The VAB-Benefit gives a parent right to economic 
compensation when he or she has to take time from work to take care of a 
child, that has not yet reached an age of 12, who is sick or infectious, or if the 
regular caretaker of the child is sick or infectious.
2 A parent is also eligible to 
compensation if he or she has to take time off from work to go to the doctor or 
child care centre with the child. VAB-benefits will not be paid when a parent 
receives sick pay, sick insurance benefit, is on vacation, is doing military 
service or is in custody in the correctional system. 
                                                      
2 Parents can also draw VAB-Benefit for children who are above 12 and below the age of 16 if 
the child needs special care or supervision.  
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VAB-benefit can be drawn for 60 days for each child and year. After these 
have been taken in use, economic compensation can be drawn for another 60 
days, though not due to the ordinary caretaker’s illness (RFV, 2001). 
The cost of Temporary Parental Benefits was 3.8 billion SEK in 2005. The 
VAB-benefit made out the absolute major part of this amount, 84 percent. The 
paternity leave benefit accounted for 16 percent of the payments and the 
“contact days” for 0.1 percent. The compensation level for the VAB-Benefit is 
at present 80 percent of the benefit determining income. The part of the income 
(wage income) that is over 10 price base amount (the “cap”) is not 
compensated.
3 The compensation is paid in relation to the time of work the 
parent has to give up, whole days or some parts -  ¾, ½, ¼ or 1/8 day. Counted 
in whole days, VAB-Benefits accounted for 5 million days in 2005. The 
average compensation was 741 SEK a day. 
It is within the VAB part of the Temporary Parental Benefit that the risk of 
excess use is the highest, as the withdrawals that account for the other parts are 
more restricted. For children under 12 years no certificate from a doctor is 
required before the 8
th day, while for children over the age of 12 it is requested 
from the 1
st day. The potential excess use can therefore be expected to be 
concentrated among caretakers with children below the age of 12. A natural 
focus for study is therefore to investigate the excess use of VAB concerning 
children from 1-11 years old. From here on it is only this part of the benefit that 
will be assessed and we will simply denote this constrained part of the benefit 
by VAB. 
1.2  The purpose 
The purpose of this study is to evaluate and work out a more precise measure 
of the excess use of the Temporary Parental Benefit, VAB. The two essential 
measurements we will focus on are the total fraction of incorrect payments 
stemming from excess use of the benefit and the closely related measure of 
total share of all benefited net days stemming from excess use of the benefit. 
We will also calculate an aggregated measure on how much the total excess use 
of the VAB-Benefit amounts to in SEK. 
It is further of great importance to discern how the excess use varies 
between different groups and regions. One objective of the study is to identify 
                                                      
3 The cap in sickness- and parental insurance was raised on the 1st of July 2006 from 7.5 price 
base amount to 10. The cap/ceiling for 2006 is 397 000 SEK. 
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different types of individuals that, to a larger extent than others, use the benefit 
excessively. This aims at mapping out certain risk groups where intensified 
monitoring could, for efficiency reasons, be needed in the future. 
1.3  Briefly about the results 
The study shows that the excess use of the benefit is considerably more 
substantial than earlier evidence suggests. In the Social Insurance Agency’s 
earlier investigations, the excess use of the benefit has been estimated to 6-10 
percent of the total payments (and approximately the same figures in terms of 
number of days on benefit). The corresponding figure in our study amounts to 
22.5 percent. When translated into SEK this estimate implies that more than 
650 million SEK per year could be attributed to excess use.
4 
There are two prime explanations for why we find a higher figure in this 
study compared to earlier findings. Firstly, the method we use differ from 
previous studies – we see clear evidence that the information method discovers 
a larger part of the excess use than studies based on randomized inspections do. 
As inspections can never be a hundred percent certain – there are always 
ways to use the benefit excessively that are impossible, for all practical 
purposes, to discover – estimates based only on random monitoring thus has an 
intrinsic tendency to underestimate the true excess use. The information 
method then offers a potential alternative. Since this study is based on the 
individuals’ own (measurable) response, we are able to appreciate a larger part 
of the excess use and in this way get a more liable estimate. Secondly, the 
inspections carried out in this study are more ambitious than was the case in 
earlier studies. An important factor in the inspections has been to check 
whether the child in question had been present at their daycare center or school 
at the time their parent or caretaker used the benefit. This margin has, due to 
limited resources and other practical problems, not been thoroughly monitored 
in earlier studies. One more important aspect, that distinguishes this study’s 
monitoring from earlier ones, lies in the timing; a shorter time has passed 
between the use of VAB and the actual monitoring in this study, than has been 
                                                      
4 The total cost of the benefit amounted to 3.3 billion SEK 2005. However, this study only 
concerns the VAB-benefits attributed to children between 1-11 years old. Data from the Social 
Insurance Agency for the year 2004 shows that this group accounts for about 90 percent of the 
total VAB-days. 
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the case in earlier ones. Since the monitoring comes closer in time, it is also 
reasonable that the quality of the monitoring will be higher. 
We found that men use the VAB-Benefit excessively to a larger extent than 
women: 28 percent compared to 19 percent. Men thus account for 50 percent 
more excess use than women given a total withdrawn amount; in other words, 
the risk that a given VAB-Krona could constitute excess use is 50 percent 
higher if it is handed out to a man instead of a woman. However, since the 
larger part of the VAB-Payments goes to women, the gender difference is 
mitigated when we instead examine the total excess use of the benefit in SEK. 
We find that practically the same total amount of excess use can be attributed 
to women as to men.  
The study finds that the information method is fruitful for the study of 
excess use with regards to this specific benefit as well as other similar public 
beneficiary systems. For example, we find no signs indicating that the receivers 
of the information letters have reacted with excessive caution in their 
withdrawal of the benefit. However, far from every one that received the letter 
seem to have taken its content seriously. A little more than half of the estimated 
total excess use stems from the individuals’ reactions to the letter. The rest is 
given by the actual monitoring, i.e. the fraction of payments that fail despite the 
received letter. 
2  Context and concepts 
In 2005 the government decided to take joint measures to secure the legitimacy 
of the welfare state’s safety nets. This led to an appointment of a delegation 
with the task to investigate incorrect payments from the social security system 
(the FUT-delegation). One of the main tasks for this delegation is to function as 
a joint association for measures against incorrect use of the public social 
security systems.  
The scope of the FUT-delegation covers all personal benefits and insurances 
in the public social security system. During 2005 the figures of such 
beneficiary arrangements reached an amount of nearly 500 billion SEK. The 
different kinds of benefits vary significantly – only the benefits administrated 
by the Swedish Social Insurance Agency amounts to 47 different categories. In 
addition to this there is the unemployment insurance system, the means tested 
social allowance, study allowances, etc. 
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The overall assignment for the delegation is to measure the extent of 
incorrect payments from the social security systems. Reliable estimates of this 
have not earlier been made on an aggregated level. Since the different kinds of 
benefit systems vary substantially, the incorrect payments have to be evaluated 
individually, before the extent of incorrectness could be calculated and 
aggregated to an overall measure. It is also reasonable to assume that the share 
of incorrect transfers varies in the different systems depending on a number of 
factors, such as the design of regulations, monitoring possibilities, etc. 
2.1  Briefly about the concepts
5 
In this study we will use the concept excess use of benefit. This term covers all 
withdrawals, caused by the recipient, that are not in line with the intentions of 
the insurance. This covers what in daily language is called “cheating” and also 
what in legal terms goes under the label “suspected fraud”. However, the wider 
concept of “incorrect transfers” (or payments) is not covered, as they also 
contain errors based on pure mistakes and blunders made by administration 
staff.
6 One limitation however, is that it is not possible in any way to question 
if a caretakers evaluation of the child’s health status is correct or not. If a 
caretaker decides to stay home from work to take care of a sick child and 
withdraws benefit from the temporary parental system, this withdrawal is 
automatically seen as correct. Accordingly, this study does not concern excess 
use in this somewhat subjective dimension. What the study aims to capture is 
rather the deliberate excess use of the benefit that that does not relate to the 
health status of the child. 
Throughout, the study’s focus is on the individual caretaker and his/hers 
withdrawals from the VAB-Benefit – it is not the household units as a whole 
that constitute the subjects in this study. In Section 7.3, however, we have 
performed a sensitivity analysis where the spouse or joint caretaker to the 
chosen caretaker is studied. Information about the children is only used for the 
purpose of defining the population eligible for the benefit. 
                                                      
5 For a more elaborate discussion of concepts relating to excess use we refer to the publication: 
Från risk till mål och resultat (FUT-Delegationen, 2005). 
6 Unintended mistakes do not lead to excess use in case withdrawals have been made incorrectly 
for day X instead of correctly for day Y, while the total amount is still correct. 
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3  Previous studies 
3.1  On the VAB-Benefit 
The National Social Insurance Agency performs continuous monitoring of the 
use of their different public insurances and benefits. During the past few years 
some systematic evaluations have been executed concerning whether the 
utilization of the social security schemes is consistent with its respective 
intentions. One of the most examined social security category is the VAB-
Benefit. Below follows a brief summary on the results from the three most 
recent evaluations.  
During 2002 the Swedish Social Insurance Agency performed random 
monitoring of withdrawals of VAB-Benefit during the month of June.
7 The 
total number of withdrawals during this month amounted to 171 298 and from 
those a randomized selection of 3 517 withdrawals was made. In the initial 
inspection of 3 370 withdrawals, 9.9 percent failed. The inspections mostly 
consisted of confirming the individual’s absence from work and, when 
possible, the child’s absence from pre-school and school.
8 In a deepened study 
of the initially failed cases it was shown that a number of those could be 
considered as correct.
9 After the deepened study only 6.4 percent of the 
withdrawals remained incorrect. 
In the subsequent study the Swedish Social Insurance Agency performed, 
during the summer of 2004, a directed monitoring of VAB-Benefit receivers.
10 
Parents with more than 10 cases during 2003 constituted the target for further 
investigation and of those it was 12 900 who had at least one case during the 
summer of 2004. From those a random selection of 940 individuals was made 
for closer monitoring. The monitoring consisted mainly of checking whether 
the parent had been present at work when claiming benefit. The results from 
this study showed that 39 percent of the parents had, on at least one occasion, 
                                                      
7 See RFV (2002) and (2003) for a more detailed description of the study. 
8 The answering frequency from pre-schools and schools was very low in this study. It was 
shown to be very difficult, during the period of the investigation in July to September, to get 
information about the child’s attendance during the month of June. 
9 This was mainly because the employers changed information plus a small share of incorrect 
information of dates from the recipients.   
10 See RFV (2004a) for a more detailed presentation of the study. 
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given incorrect information that lead to overcompensation. The incorrect 
payments accounted for 8.5 percent of the days compensated. 
The Social Insurance Agency executed one additional investigation on the 
VAB-Benefit during the autumn of 2005. Individuals were divided into 
different groups contingent on their prior withdrawal pattern in order to 
examine whether the distribution of the incorrect payments differed depending 
on their historic utilization of the benefit. In total, 934 parents were selected by 
stratification from the three groups, and among these, 931 individuals were 
actually examined. The monitoring consisted of verification with employers 
and unemployment benefit funds. The share of parents whom had given 
incorrect information, in the group of parents accounting for 1-5 cases of 
withdrawals during the previous year, was 16 percent; the corresponding share 
in the group of parents accounting for 5-10 cases was about 29 percent; and the 
group of parents with more than 10 withdrawals a fraction of 41 percent had at 
some occasion given incorrect information. The total number of cases exam-
ined corresponded to 13 700 days of VAB-Benefit, from which 870 days failed 
when monitored. In the three different groups the distribution of incorrectly 
compensated days was fairly even: 6.9 percent incorrect compensations in the 
group with the least amount of cases, 6.1 percent in the middle group and 6.4 
percent in the group with the highest amount of cases. The distribution was 
somewhat more uneven in terms of share of compensation in SEK. The corre-
sponding figures were 6.8 percent fail rate of the payments to the low-
consumption group and 5.3 percent fail rate for the group with more than 10 
cases of VAB-Benefit. In 71 percent of the incorrect cases, more than one 
whole day of compensation had been paid incorrectly. The most usual cause for 
error, according to the investigation, was that a parent had been at work during 
the period corresponding with when he/she had applied for VAB-Benefit. No 
controls were made towards schools or pre-schools. 
3.2  Previous studies where information letters have been 
used 
We have only found a few examples of studies where methods similar to the 
one used here have been applied. These are briefly described below. We may 
also note that we have not found any earlier study evaluating the benefits of the 
method compared to alternative methods (in our case traditional random moni-
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toring). To our knowledge this study is the first to examine the pros and cons of 
the method in both theory and practice.
11  
3.2.1  Tax evasion, Minnesota 
An extensive experiment was carried out in 1995 by the local tax authority 
in Minnesota to test different strategies to improve voluntary compliance with 
state income tax. One of the tested strategies was to send out information letters 
notifying increased monitoring of tax returns, during the time before the tax 
returns should be handed to the authorities. This information letter was sent to 
one group which was to be representative of the population as a whole, as well 
as to one other group that was expected to be a risk group regarding tax evasion 
(tax payers with business or farm income).  In total about 47 000 taxpayers 
were randomly selected to participate in this experiment; from those 1  724 
individuals received an information letter. The letter informed the tax payer 
that he/she had been randomly selected for a study where the number of 
examinations of income tax returns would be increased. The information letter 
further declared that the income tax returns for both the state- as well as the 
federal tax would be subject to examination, and that if there was any 
misconducts discovered, further information was to be claimed paired with a 
more profound inspection. In that case, a more thorough investigation of earlier 
year’s tax returns was a potential outcome. 
The measurement used to estimate the tax payers´ willingness to pay taxes 
consisted of changes in declared income and changes in paid taxes between the 
years 1993 and 1994. These changes were compared with changes within the 
group which did not receive an information letter.  
Low- and average income earners who received the letter about increased 
monitoring, reported higher incomes and paid more tax than what was the case 
in the representative control group. The increase was larger for those tax payers 
who had farm or business income. No statistically significant effects were 
discovered for high income earners. (Coleman, 1996) 
Slemrod et al (2001) interprets the induced increase in declared taxes as a 
potential measure of tax evasion. This is an intuitive interpretation and it is 
indeed the key identification strategy used in the information method. 
                                                      
11 For the theoretical description of the method, see Section 0. A more elaborate scientific 
description of the method can be found in Engström and Hesselius (2007). 
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3.2.2  Tax evasion, Great Britain 
In Great Britain the tax authority carried out an experiment with information 
letters to entrepreneurs with a turnover of less than £ 15 000 in 2002. Five 
different letters were sent with varying messages. These different messages 
were: 
i)  “We can provide you with advice and support” 
ii)  “Paying the right tax increases public spending on hospitals, schools, 
etc.” 
iii)  A warning: “We are increasing inquiries – your return may be chosen.” 
iv)  As in letter 4 – but adding that “we charge financial penalties” 
v)  “Your 2001 Return has already been selected for audit”. 
 
Some of the entrepreneurs in the selected group did not receive any 
information letter, and thereby constituted the control group. Compared to the 
control group the entrepreneurs who received information letters, with the 
message (iii), (iv) and (v), significantly increased net surplus. The share of tax 
returns was examined in the group (iii) and (iv) as well as the control group. 
The result from this examination showed that the paid tax became more 
accurate when it was preceded by an information letter. (OECD, 2004 and 
Hasseldine et al, 2007). 
3.2.3  The “Paternity Leave Letter” 
In 2003 the Swedish Social Insurance Agency sent out a circular to about 
300  000 fathers reminding them about their remaining paternity leave days. 
These letters were directed to fathers of children less than 7 years old, who had 
used less than 40 percent of their parental benefit and had at least 25 days 
remaining. The control group consisted of fathers who received the letter six 
months later. The group of fathers who received the letter six months earlier 
made use of 1.5 more parental benefit days on average compared to the control 
group. This corresponds to 25 percent of the days that fathers in the treatment 
group withdrew in total during this period. The “paternity leave letter” thus 
affected the share of parental benefit days withdrawn by men (RFV 2004).  
3.2.4  Pregnant smokers 
In a study carried out by Sexton & Hebel (1984) mothers’ smoking habits 
influence on the fetus was examined. A circular, on the hazards of smoking 
while pregnant, was sent to the half of 900 pregnant women in an early state of 
their pregnancy. The share of smokers measured in the 8th month of pregnancy 
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was significantly lower in the group receiving the letter. On average, the birth 
weight was 92 g higher and the length 0.5 cm longer for the babies whose 
mothers received the letter. Through a follow up questionnaire it was found 
that those who received the letter smoked on average 6.4 cigarettes less a day 
compared to the control group. This study thus showed evidence for clear 
effects of information, as well as the hazards of smoking during pregnancy. 
4  Method and implementation 
To estimate the average excess use of the VAB-Benefit, an extensive 
randomized experiment has been carried out. The authors have been 
responsible for the design of the experiment and the analysis of the results. The 
Social Insurance Agency has been responsible for the practical execution of the 
experiment, such as sending out letters and information brochures as well as 
the actual monitoring.  
The experiment can roughly be described as follows. First, a randomized 
selection of the eligible individuals was selected to be included in a treatment 
group. These individuals were informed through circulars notifying them that 
they were included in a randomized group whose use of the VAB-Benefit was 
to be exposed to closer monitoring for a period of time. The individuals in the 
treatment group were not informed whether they actually were to be inspected 
or how substantial the risk for this was. 
 
 




















About  7000 
individuals 
 
Smaller group C: 
 






About  7000 
individuals 
 
Figure 1. The three treatment groups 
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To get as much information as possible from the experiment, we separated 
the treatment group into three distinct groups, two small (B and C) and one 
large (A). The larger group received a letter informing the receiver that she had 
been selected randomly into a group which would be exposed to intensified 
monitoring along with a small pamphlet explaining the rules of the benefit.
12    
In the two smaller groups we varied the treatment according to the 
following (see Figure 1): (i) group B received only the brief information 
pamphlet and no added information of them being targeted for intensified 
monitoring; (ii) group C received only notice that they are subject to increased 
monitoring, and no accompanying pamphlet. This design aims at capturing: (i) 
the effect of the information of the rules in itself, and (ii) the effect of 
knowledge about intensified monitoring while the individual acts on her own 
idea about the set of rules regarding the benefit. 
The treatment groups most central for the estimate of excess use are group 
A and group C (denoted AC), since those individuals have received 
information about increased monitoring and therefore can be expected to adjust 
their behavior in line with what the rules of the benefit prescribe. It is uncertain 
what effect may be expected from only receiving the informative brochure. 
Among those who were not actively aware of the benefit’s existence, one 
would expect an increase in withdrawals. On the other hand, some individuals 
may perceive the pamphlet as an indirect notice of increased monitoring, in 
which case we would expect the same kind of effects as in group A and C. 
The remaining population we denote D. It consists of the nearly 1.3 million 
individuals entitled to the benefit, but who are not part of any treatment group. 
This group (D) constitutes what in similar cases usually is called “control 
group”. A control group represents a sort of reference not undergoing the 
treatment the researcher wants to measure the effects from (similar to placebo 
groups in medical experiments). To avoid misunderstandings, however, we will 
avoid the term “control group” in this study since it could be close at hand to 
interpret this as individuals who will be monitored. Instead we will use the term 
“remaining population” and “untreated population” as synonymous references 
to group D. 
                                                      
12 See Appendix 1 for the design of the letter and appendix 2 for the information brochure.  
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4.1  Circulars 
Letters and information brochures to the selected caretakers in the different 
treatment groups were sent out on the 24
th of March. The majority of those 
reached its receivers four days later on the 28
th. The period of the experiment 
started on the 29
th of March and carried on until the 31
st of May. The 
individuals who received the letter were informed about the increased 
monitoring procedure and that they had been selected by random into a group 
which was targeted for intensified monitoring; see Appendix 1 for the exact 
design of the letter. 
The Social Insurance Agency also established a temporary call-center and a 
special e-mail box to where those who received the letters (group A and C) 
could turn with questions. To those individuals who only received the brochure 
describing the set of rules of the benefit (group B), an information sheet was 
also attached. In this sheet it was told that the Social Insurance Agency wanted 
to inform parents about the regulations associated with the VAB-Benefit (see 
Appendix 2). 
4.2  Implementation of monitoring 
From those who were selected to the three treatment groups, a certain share 
(about 30 percent) had their withdrawals from the VAB-Benefit examined. 
Each regional Social Insurance Agency was responsible for examining a 
number of cases. The cases were brought to the local agencies in three separate 
waves. One reason for this sequential process was that the administrators 
should not be overloaded with work all at once. But the main reason was to 
minimize the elapsed period between withdrawal and monitoring. 
The chosen individuals’ withdrawals were closely examined through 
contacts with employers and pre-schools/schools, and also crosschecked 
against the unemployment benefits etc. The absence during the compensated 
time was checked with the employer along with the grounds for absence (care 
for sick child, vacation, compensatory leave, work allocation, or else). Through 
the contact with school/pre-schools the child’s absence status was checked for 
the period when compensation had been withdrawn, as well as the reason for 
the child’s absence. 
4.3  Description of the method 
To understand the information method we picture a universal benefit with some 
possibility for excessive use. Let X percent of all compensated days stem from 
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excess use. The aim is to identify the size of X with highest possible precision. 
The randomization makes the selected treatment group representative for the 
entire population (those who are eligible for the benefit in question). The 
situation is described in Figure 2. 
Since the individuals in the treatment group have been informed about the 
intensified monitoring of their withdrawals, they may be assumed to adjust 
their use in accordance with the systems’ regulations, during the experimental 
period. In a best case scenario, individuals who earlier used the benefit 
excessively – and only those individuals – will lower their use and now only 
make legitimate withdrawals of the benefit. In this way we could get an 
approximate estimate of the true level of excess use by comparing the average 











X  X 
The treatment group  Remaining population   
Figure 2. The number of days compensated by individual before the 
information on intensified inspections. 
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Increased risk of being 
discovered eliminates excess use
X 
The treatment group  Remaining population 
 
Figure 3. The ideal case - the whole amount of excess use may be identified. 
 
The scenario described above is of course utopian. In practice there are a 
number of possible reactions to the letter and some of those may complicate the 
interpretation of differences in withdrawals in the treatment group compared to 
the rest of the population. We will revisit such issues in the following section. 
It is of great importance to point out that the strategy described above is not 
based on that individuals finally will be caught in the monitoring process. 
Instead we aim at, through the use of information about increased monitoring, 
induce individuals to adjust their use of the benefit to be in line with the 
regulations. Since the selection process of individuals into the treatment groups 
is random, it is thereafter possible to identify the aggregate level of excess use. 
It should also be noted that each individual in the treatment group, who fails in 
the inspections, will be an indicator of to what degree the identification 
procedure described above will underestimate the true level of excess use; if a 
treated individual’s withdrawal fails in the monitoring process it means that she 
has not adjusted her use of the benefit in line with it’s rules and intensions, 
despite the fact that she was informed about her exposure to increased 
monitoring.  
IFAU – Excessive use of Temporary Parental Benefit  18 
4.4  The advantages and disadvantages of the information 
method in this study 
In order to get more tangible we will now turn to the VAB-Benefit explicitly. 
There are many ways in which this benefit could be used excessively, for 
example: 
(i)  To escape the qualifying period in the individual sick-pay. The 
individual sick-pay has a qualifying period of one day at each new 
sickness spell. After this day the compensation level in the sick-pay 
and the VAB-Benefit is equal (with some exceptions).
13 The cost for 
the individual of staying home due to own illness is therefore higher 
than when she pretends to be home taking care of a sick child. 
(ii)  Additional income through the parent being at work while at the same 
time claiming VAB-Benefit. When staying at home to take care of a sick 
child, this is reported directly to the Social Insurance Agency. There is 
no automatic inspection executed in order to confirm the absence 
status.  
(iii) Extra income through working in the black market. The parent usually 
works in the white sector; when the opportunity to work on the black 
market occurs, the parent can get both compensation for lost income, 
by means of the VAB-Benefit, and extra income through temporary 
work. 
(iv)  The child is attendant at school or pre-school while VAB-Benefit is 
claimed. The parent may be home from work, due to any reason, while 
letting the child attend school or pre-school. 
(v)  To be home with healthy child. A parent takes time off work using the 
VAB-Benefit compensation, while at the same time keeps the child 
absent from school/pre-school.  
 
To appreciate the advantages of the information method, we will first briefly 
describe how the usual random monitoring procedure may partially fail in 
capturing the types of misuse described above. 
                                                      
13 The compensation level when sick-pay is paid by the employer is based on the salary and not 
on the temporary disability benefit founded income. A person who’s salary is above a certain 
ceiling in the disability or illness benefit will also receive compensation for the part of the salary 
that exceeds this ceiling during the sick-pay period (the first 14 days). She thus has a higher 
compensation during this period than what she would receive from the VAB-Benefit. 
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4.4.1  Traditional random monitoring 
Traditional random monitoring simply consists of random selection of a 
number of withdrawals that will be closely investigated. The legitimacies of 
withdrawals, with regards to the above types of excessive use, are possible to 
examine to a varying degree: 
i)  To escape the qualifying period in the individual sick-pay. Inspection is 
possible only if the child usually attends school or pre-school and the 
caretaker does not keep the child at home. 
ii)  Additional income through the parent being at work while at the same 
time claiming VAB-Benefit. This is theoretically possible to monitor 
through contacts with the employer. However, the employer may be 
loyal to the employee, which would make monitoring harder. If 
inspections are carried out after a long period of time, there is also a 
risk that the employer no longer keeps the attendance list. While a 
parent works, the child usually attends school or pre-school, in which 
case their attendance lists could be checked. However, in practice, the 
attendance lists are not usually kept for long, so it may not always be 
possible to obtain the necessary information. 
iii)  Extra income through working in the black market. Monitoring could 
be possible through the child’s presence in school and pre-school. 
Direct investigations of black market work would be very complicated 
and costly.  
iv)  The child is attendant at school or pre-school while VAB-Benefit is 
claimed. Monitoring could be possible through the child’s presence in 
school and pre-school. 
v)  To be home with healthy child. This form of excess use of the benefit is 
practically impossible to reach through monitoring. 
 
The crucial point is that inspections never, with a realistic budget and 
authorized directives, can be a hundred percent reliable. Even if an individual’s 
withdrawal does not fail in the monitoring process, we cannot be sure that it 
indeed was made in accordance with the benefit’s rules and intentions. The 
lesson to learn from this line of reasoning is that the random monitoring 
procedure has an intrinsic tendency to underestimate the level of excess use of 
the benefit. 
  
IFAU – Excessive use of Temporary Parental Benefit  20 
Discovered 
excess use = pX 
Total 
excess use = X 
Undiscovered  
excess use = (1-p)X 
 
 
Figure 4. The spot traditional random monitoring strategy underestimates the 
level of excess use. 
 
Let us say that an incorrect withdrawal of the benefit is discovered with the 
likelihood of p. The situation can then be described as in Figure 4. Random 
monitoring will consequently underestimate the total excess use of the VAB-
Benefit: the estimate of X will have expected value pX and the expected 
underestimation will accordingly amount to (1-p)X. At this point it is also 
important to point out that from our position as investigators, we do not know 
the likelihood (p) to get caught, given that the individual uses the benefit 
excessively and is actually monitored; if we knew this it would be straight-
forward to scale up the estimate pX with a factor of 1/p and thereby get an 
accurate expected value estimate of the true level of excess use. 
4.4.2  The Information Method 
How, then, are we going to get past these problems by using the information 
method, in combination with random monitoring, to estimate X? As earlier 
noticed, the identification of X is not primarily based on the actual share of 
withdrawals that fails when monitored; instead, the individuals own response to 
the information letter is crucial. So what does this response consist of? We can 
imagine a number of scenarios: 
i)  An individual who earlier has been negligent in her declarations on the 
exact dates will now be more careful. 
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ii)  An individual who has consciously used the benefit excessively stops 
doing so from fear of being caught and being reported to the police and 
inspected retroactively. 
iii)  The individual did not use the benefit excessively before, and 
consequently does not do so after receiving the letter either – there will 
be no effect on use at all. 
iv)  The individual did not use the benefit excessively before, but now she 
becomes anxious and does not take the full compensation that she is 
entitled to. 
v)  The individual does not even open the letter; alternatively, she does not 
take the warning of increased monitoring seriously, and therefore 
continues to use the benefit excessively. In this category we also 
include the strategy to switch from one form of excess use to another 
form that is harder to detect through monitoring; for example, the 
individual could switch from staying home from work due to own 
illness, while the child attends school or pre-school, to the hardly 
detectable “staying home with a healthy child”. 
vi)  The individual has not been actively aware of the existence of the 
benefit and therefore initially under-utilizes the benefit. Information 
about the set of rules – also in the case information about increased 
monitoring was attached (group A) – can then lead to new found 
knowledge about the VAB-Benefit and thus increased use. 
 
In the ideal case the individual responds in line with scenario i), ii) or iii). 
This represents the result described in association with Figure 3 above. If the 
individuals react only in accordance to these three alternatives our estimate of 
X, in terms of expected value, coincides with the true value of X, the average 
excess use of the benefit. It should also be noted that, in this case, none of the 
individuals exposed to inspection, will “get caught” in the monitoring process.  
It is, however, possible that certain individuals respond in accordance with 
scenario iv), v) or vi) above. Such responses cause some problems in 
estimating the value of X – reactions corresponding with iv) induce an 
overestimation of X while responses in line with scenario v) or vi) tend to 
underestimate X. It is therefore of great importance to avoid such reactions, as 
far as practically possible. Below, we describe how these aspects have been 
taken into consideration in the design of the experiment. 
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Scenario iv) The individual did not use the benefit excessively before, but now 
she becomes anxious and does not take the full compensation that she is 
entitled to.  
This type of response is very serious, as it could lead to the information method 
overestimating the average excess use of the VAB-Benefit. Below follows a 
number of strategies that we have used to minimize the risk of inducing this 
type of response. 
•  The tone in the letter is deliberately “kind”; those who know that they 
have not been using the benefit incorrectly should not have to worry 
about the intensified monitoring.
14 When it comes to this particular 
benefit, the absolute majority of excess use is probably deliberate, i.e. 
you know when you use the benefit correctly and when you do not. This 
contrasts with e.g. unemployment insurance or sickness insurance where 
the definition of excess use is considerably fuzzier. 
•  In the letter it is clearly declared that the selection of individuals chosen 
for intensified monitoring was completely random; they have not been 
selected due to any wrongdoing in the past.  
•  The letter was accompanied with a comprehensible pamphlet explaining 
the, relatively simple, rules of the benefit (group A).  
•  A call center was set up by the Social Insurance Agency to which 
worried benefit recipients could turn with questions about the letter. 
 
To appreciate the extent of the problem we have also studied how the 
withdrawals of the other caretaker were influenced when the partner received 
the letter. If the child truly was considered sick, i.e. the use was correct, the 
withdrawals of the other caretaker would be a likely substitute to own 
withdrawals – which would not be the case in most cases of  excessive use of 
the benefit (for example concerning the caretakers own illness, presence at 
work and working in the black sector. An over-reaction to the letter is then 
likely to lead to increased withdrawals of the partner. If we find such a reaction 
we have an indication of certain individuals indeed reacting according to 
scenario iv). 
One further strategy, that due to time limitations has not been included in 
this study, would be to complement the information letters with interviews 
                                                      
14 See appendix 1 for the exact design of the letter 
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and/or questionnaires to gather information on the individuals’ thoughts 
concerning the letter. 
 
Scenario v): The letter is ignored or not taken seriously. 
This reaction provides a potential underestimation of X, i.e. it represents an 
opposite problem to the one described above. Note firstly that if we consider 
the extreme case, when no one opens the letter, we would have a situation 
identical to the random monitoring procedure. The full measure of excess use 
would be based on the monitoring and our only loss is that we sent out all these 
letters in vain. The worst that could happen from this scenario is thus that we 
do not get anything additional out of using the information method. But for 
every individual we do influence to react in line with scenario ii), our 
estimation of X becomes better. It is therefore of great importance to reduce the 
response according to scenario v) as far as possible. Below follows the 
strategies utilized for this purpose: 
•  It is clearly stated in the letter that the inspections concerns future 
withdrawals between date a and b. If the individual believes that the 
inspection already have started he or she may react as if the “damage 
already has been done”, and thus fail to stop excessively using the 
benefit. 
•  Some key phrases in the letters are forceful. Those underline distinc-
tively that that it will be specifically Your withdrawals that will undergo 
intensified monitoring, and that the present letter was not sent out to 
everyone. 
•  The letter also points to the fact that this monitoring is special and out of 
the ordinary. This served the purpose of bringing further credibility to 
the risk of getting monitored. 
 
In this context we would like to stress that, on a long-term basis, the main 
strategy to avoid reactions in accordance with scenario v) is to invest in good 
monitoring quality. If the intensified monitoring, that was referred to in the 
letter, fails to appear, or if the actual inspections are too indulgent, the usage of 
the method in subsequent studies could be undermined. 
 
Scenario vi): The individual “discovers” the benefit as a result of the 
information letter. 
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This reaction is very tricky to prevent. But, the design of the experiment, with 
the arrangement into groups A, B and C, aims to bring an indication of the 
extent of the problem. In group B we try to refine the effect of receiving only 
the information about the benefit, while group C only receives the letter 
declaring intensified monitoring without the additional pamphlet. However, it 
is principally impossible to inform about increased monitoring of a benefit 
without at the same time informing about the very existence of the benefit. 
Even so, it seems reasonable to presume that a reaction in accordance with 
scenario vi) would be most distinct in group B and least distinct in group C, 
which could give us an approximate picture of how extensive our problems 
linked with this type of reaction are. 
5  Data 
5.1  Selection 
Our population is defined by those who are eligible for the benefit – in 
principle every caretaker, with a few exceptions, with children in the age 1-11 
years old.
15 This means that the population approximately consists of all 
Swedish caretakers of children born between 1
st of June 1994 and 20
th of March 
2005. The selection into treatment groups were then determined by random 
birthdates of the caretakers. As a consequence of this selection procedure both 
caretakers in a few families would receive any of the three treatments. To avoid 
such incidences we could have included only one of the caretakers of a child in 
a treatment group. This would, however, complicate the selection procedure 
considerably, and in part it would have been impossible to implement with the 
present data. There are two reasons for this. First, if the child has had more than 
two caretakers during her lifetime, we cannot know which of those that are 
currently registered as caretakers. Second, we do not know whether the two 
caretakers live together and indeed live with the child. To avoid excluding 
single parents, and to be able to replicate the selection easily, we let both 
caretakers be included in the treatment groups in these (relatively few) cases. 
                                                      
15 The individuals who were unregistered, taken into custody, doing military service, caretakers 
with protected identity and persons missing from the tsunami-catastrophe were not included in 
the treatment group or remaining population. 
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This occurred for 1078 out of 64 284 children whose one or both parents is 
included in group A, B or C. 
As a part of the sensitivity analyses we will, as mentioned above, study 
cross effects among separate caretakers (see Section 7.3); what happens with 
the withdrawals made by one of the caretakers when the other caretaker is 
selected to the treatment group (A, B or C)? This analysis is done on a 
somewhat limited population, since we want it to be two caretakers in as close 
relationship as possible – the ideal being the traditional nuclear family. 
However, we do not have the information on whether the caretakers of the 
child live together or not. In the cases when a child’s caretakers have changed, 
we do not know who the current caretakers are. For this reason we have 
defined our somewhat limited population from the observations where the 
children only have had two caretakers during their lifetime and when those and 
the child were registered in the same parish and when none of the caretakers 
have children in the age of 1 to 11 years together with another partner. We also 
exclude all “families” where both caretakers have had any kind of treatment 
(A, B or C). Given this selection of population we have a remaining 83.6 
percent of the origin, which is close to official numbers from Statistics Sweden 
for the year 2004 that shows that 78 percent of the children in the age 1 to 11 
years old lives with their original parents.
16 
5.2  Descriptive statistics 
Table 1 shows the number of individuals, age and gender distribution in the 
different groups. In total 42 249 individuals were included in some treatment 
group – from those 28 543 were in group A, 7051 in group B and 6 655 in 
group C. The remaining population (group D) contains 1 272 993 individuals. 
It should be noted that there are no statistical significant gender and age 
differences when comparing the different treatment groups (A, B and C) to the 
remaining population (D). Since the confidence interval for the share of 
women, as well as average age, in the treatment groups (Table 1) cover the 
value of these variables in the remaining population (D), it follows that there 
are no significant differences in share of women or in age average. Neither are 
there any significant differences between these variables when comparing the 
treatment groups in pairs.  
                                                      
16 It is natural that we get a somewhat higher number than Statistics Sweden, since we include 
those parents who are separated but still liver in the same parish. 
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In this study we have used a reference period against which the different 
groups’ withdrawals may be compared (see Figure 5 and Figure 6 below for the 
withdrawals made by the whole population during the reference period as well 
as the experiment period). We decided to use the six months that preceded the 
experiment period, minus a “buffer month” in between the reference period and 
the actual experiment period. The reason for using a buffer month is that some 
people linger with their applications for VAB-Benefit for a few weeks. When 
an individual, in the end of March, receives the letter about intensified 
monitoring there is thus a possibility that she will reduce earlier withdrawals 
retroactively. This could have the effect that we underestimate the effect of the 
letter. Our reference period was thus made out of the 5 months between 05-10-
01 and 06-02-28.
17  
If the random selection process has been correct, the expected withdrawal 
patterns within the different groups are identical. According to the confidence 
intervals given in Table 2, that presents the average fraction of men and women 
that made withdrawals, as well as the average number of VAB-Benefit days 
during the reference period, there were no significant differences between the 
groups A, B and the remaining population. But for the small group C, the 
average withdrawal is significantly larger than it was in group D. One 
explanation for this could be pure chance: we may have got an unusually high 
average need of the benefit by the caretakers in group C. When considering a 
95 percent confidence level, pure chance would make us falsely reject the 
hypothesis that the underlying parameters are equal, in one out of 20 cases.
18  If 
we instead look at group A and C jointly (the AC group), the significant 
differences between all remaining groups (AC, B and D) disappear.  
                                                      
17 An alternative would have been to instead use the period previous year (2005) corresponding 
to the experiment period (2006). But since the population eligible for the benefit changes over 
time, we found it more suitable to let the reference period be relatively close in time to the 
experiment period.  
18 It should be noted that the difference does not disappear when we cut the top of the withdrawal 
distribution, which means that it is not due to a small number of extreme cases, “outliers”, 
producing the higher number of withdrawals in group C. We have compared the C-group’s 
constitution – concerning a number of variables such as age, gender, profession etc – with the 
constitutions of the other groups without finding any statistically significant deviations. We 
therefore conclude that the random selection has been correctly carried out and that the C-group, 
simply by chance, has been assigned a larger fraction of individuals with a somewhat increased 
demand for VAB-Benefit.   
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics for the treatment groups (A, B and C) and the 
remaining population (D). 
 
Group  Number of individuals Share of women  Average age  




















Table 2. Withdrawal patterns during the reference period (2005-10-01 until 
2006-02-28). 
Group  
Percent share of 
women withdrawing 
VAB-Benefit on an 
average day 
Percent share of men 
withdrawing VAB-
Benefit on an average 
day 
Percent of all 
individuals 
withdrawing VAB-


























Note: 95 percent confidence interval in parenthesis. 



























Figure 5. Withdrawal amount of VAB-Benefit in SEK per individual and week, 
for the whole population (A+B+C+D) with children in the age’s 1-11 years old 
























Figure 6. Compensated net days of VAB-Benefit per individual and week for 
the whole population (A+B+C+D) with children in the age’s of 1-11 years old 
(from week 40/2005 until week22/2006). 
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6  Statistical method
19 
Our estimate of the total excess use of the VAB-Benefit will be composed of 
two components: it is partly made out of the potential decrease in withdrawals 
induced by the letters, and partly of the results of monitoring in itself. The 
statistical analyses behind the two measures are separate. We will therefore 
account for the underlying analysis of each component separately. Finally, we 
will describe the potential caveats of aggregating the two separate measures 
into a total measure of excess use. We will here only focus on the measure of 
the relative number of SEK stemming from excess use of the VAB-Benefit. 
However, the principle is identical when instead considering the measure 
related to the fraction of VAB-days stemming from excess use. 
6.1  The letter effect 
When estimating the relative effect of the treatment (the letter) we have used a 
so called ”difference-in-difference”-estimator (DiD) instead if the simpler 
“difference”-estimator (D-estimator). Both methods are unbiased in a 
randomized experiment. But under certain conditions the DiD-estimator is 
more efficient than the D-estimator. If the individual specific variation is high, 
efficiency gains could be made through the use of the DiD-estimator. 
Moreover, if there is an individual specific variation, a D-estimator could be 
seriously biased, ex post, if the randomization accidentally has given a sample 
that differs significantly from the population. In our example there is reason to 
believe that this is the case in the C-group. If the D-estimator is implemented 
on the C-group we may therefore get a biased result; in our case we measure no 
significant effect of the letter in the C-group when using the D-estimator. This 
is due to the average withdrawal level being unusually high in this group. 
However, for the AC-group as a whole we only get a marginally different result 
if we use the D- instead of the DiD-estimator. A very brief technical 
explanation of the DiD-estimator is presented below. The D-estimator is 
generated, in technical terms, from the DiD-estimator by setting all recipients’ 
withdrawals during the reference period to 0 (or any other constant). The 
                                                      
19 The technically unfamiliar/uninterested may preferably skip this section. 
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difference between the estimators thus lies in that the simple D-estimator is not 
using any information on earlier withdrawal patterns. 
We consider two separate periods of time (top-index t), period 0 and period 
1, which refer to the reference period (0) and the experiment period (1). 
Assume that one individual in group  ( ) , gC T = – where C specifies the 
comparison group and T specifies the treatment group – has the following 
withdrawal pattern: 
tt tt
gig g UI αδ τ =++ + i ε ,  
where 
t
g U refers to the withdrawal of the benefit,   is a time specific 
component and 
t α
g I  is an individual specific component. The third component, 
t
g δτrefers to the treatment effect; 
t
g δ  is an indicator variable taking value of 
one if   and  , and zero otherwise, while τ  is the size of the 
treatment effect which consequently is the parameter we want to estimate. At 
last   refers to an error term (with the expected value of zero) and which 
variance could potentially vary over time. 
g = T 1 t =
t
i ε
Consider now the difference in withdrawals of the benefit, between the 
treatment period and the reference period, for an individual (i) in the treatment 
group: 
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and note how the individually specific term cancels out, herein lies the virtue of 
the DiD-estimator compared to a simple D-estimator. When using the D-
estimator the individual effect cancels out only after we apply the expectation 
operator on the difference between the groups. By using information on earlier 
withdrawals, we can eliminate the time constant individual effect already on 
the individual level, which potentially could reduce the variance in our 
estimate. 
Consider now the difference in withdrawals of benefit between treatment 
period and reference period for an individual (k) in the untreated comparison 
group: 
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Finally, we obtain the absolute treatment effect by taking the difference of 
the expected values of the above given differences: 
()() TC EU EU τ Δ− Δ= . 
Trough estimation of  ( T ) E U Δ  and  ( C) E U Δ  from data of withdrawals 
we can thus obtain an unbiased estimation of  τ according to: 
()() TC EU EU ˆˆ ˆ τ = Δ− Δ. 
We proceed, in order to estimate the relative treatment effect ( ), by 
dividing the difference in differences with the average use of VAB-Benefit by 

















Thus, the estimation contains of a quota between an estimated absolute 
treatment effect and the estimated total withdrawal of the comparison group 
during the treatment period. Since the denominator is a stochastic variable there 
are certain problems associated with the calculation of the variance of . ˆrel τ
20 A 
standard solution to this problem is to use the so called Delta method, which 
gives an approximately correct variance for . ˆrel τ
21 The variance measures we 
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Since the withdrawals of the treatment group can be expected to be 
independent of the withdrawals of the remaining population, there should be no 
significant co-variance between the measures and the last term could thus be 
                                                      
20 Note that we see the whole remaining population as independent random draws from an 
infinite population. 
21 The Delta method is based on the first order of Taylor-approximation and is described in 
several standard textbooks; see e.g. Greene (2003). 
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set to zero. It is worth noticing that the variance measure for   does not 
change much when using the Delta-method, compared to the more naïve 





6.2  The monitoring component 










where   is incorrectly paid to individual ,   is the total amount paid to 
individual  , and n  is the number of inspected individuals.
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22 Hence, the 
estimation contains of a quota between the mean value of the individuals 
incorrect compensations () F  and the mean value for the paid amount() U . 
Since the estimation contains of stochastic variables in both the numerator and 
the denominator we have some problems with the variance estimate for   as 
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In this case we cannot exclude the co-variance term, since it may possibly 
be a correlation between incorrect paid amount and total paid amount. Also in 
this case we should mention that the difference in variance estimates is very 
small when using the Delta method compared to the more naïve approach in 
which U  is treated as a constant. 
6.3  Total measure 
The effect from the letter described above in Section 6.1 corresponds to a 
measure on how individuals react to information about intensified monitoring. 
                                                      
22 When it comes to the monitoring component, all withdrawals refer to the treatment group 
during the experiment period, why we suppress the sub-index (for group) and top-index (for 
time) in this sub-section. 
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Decreased withdrawals (i.e. a negative relative effect) are interpreted as a 
decrease in excess use. The partial estimate of excess use, the information 
induced estimate, is thus given by, 
ˆ ˆ rel rel φτ = −  
The total measure on excessive use is principally the sum of the information 
estimate ( ) and the share of payments that get caught through monitoring 
( ). For minor (a few percent) effects this is quite accurate. But when we 
consider larger effects such approximation is not satisfactory. One example 
illustrates the logic: assume that the information effect gives an estimate of 
excess use of 50 percent (i.e. paid amount decrease by 50 percent due to the 
letters) and, furthermore, let 50 percent of the remaining paid amount fail in the 
monitoring process. If we simply sum up these components flat we get a total 
effect of 100 percent, which obviously cannot be accurate. The true estimate 
would in this example rather arrive at 75 percent. When we sum up the two 
percentage rates flat we are summing up apples and pears, as they concern two 
different reference levels. We therefore have to weight the share of failing 
payments by using the “letter-effect-adjusted” level of withdrawals before we 





According to this principle our total estimation  ( ) will be,  ˆ
rel T
1 ˆˆ ˆˆ () rel rel rel rel TK φφ =+ −  
Here as well we are facing some problems with the calculation of variance 
measures. The variance for the first term we already have. The other term 
variance can be obtained using the Delta-method. There is however potential 
covariance between   and  , as well as between the two main terms, that 
are difficult to estimate. 
ˆrel τ ˆ
rel K
The equation above can be rewritten as: 
() () 11 1 ˆ ˆˆ
rel rel rel TK φ = −− − . 
Through variable substitution and the Delta-method we get: 
n ()n () () () n () () ()
() n () ( ) n ()
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2 2
11 1 1 1
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In this expression a co-variance remains between   and   which we 
are unable to estimate in this case. However, the co-variance ought to be 
negative; a large letter effect would lead to fewer being caught in the moni-
toring process. This means that the last is likely to be negative. To estimate the 
variance assuming independence between the included components therefore 




7  Results 
In this section the results of the study will be presented. We will start with 
the main results of the estimate of total excess use based on the information 
effect and the outcome of monitoring. In Section 7.2 the outcome from the 
monitoring is presented in depth. We will there present the distribution between 
different reasons why the withdrawals failed. In Section 7.3 we will study the 
behavior of the other caretaker when the partner is treated. An overreaction to 
the letter – the caretaker stops using the benefit even though she is fully eligible 
to it – would tend to increase the withdrawals of the partner since this 
constitutes a close substitute when using the benefit correctly. In Section 7.4 
we present the results separately for a number of subgroups. 
7.1  The main result 
From the description of the method in Section 0 as well as the statistical 
method in Section 6 it was made clear that the estimation of the total excess use 
of the VAB-Benefit will be composed of two main estimates: in part the 
potential reduction of withdrawals that may follow from the letters, and in part 
the result from the actual monitoring. The results from both of these 
components and the aggregate estimate of excess use are presented in Table 3. 
The main analysis in the entire result section will concern only the AC-
group, i.e. the ones who received the letter with information about intensified 
monitoring (the AC-group consists of group A and C which constitutes our 
proper treatment group). 
To reach the effect of the letter/information we compare the changed 
withdrawals in the separate groups during the separate time periods – the 
experiment period and the reference period. As shown in Figure 7 and 8, the 
withdrawal pattern during the reference period shows the same shape in the 
AC-group as in the D-group. As we then entry into the experiment period an 
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apparent relative decrease in withdrawals occur for the treated group, AC; this 
is the effect of the letter.
23 A clear sign of the weekly based figures being a bit 
shaky (high variance) is the substantial temporary increase in withdrawals of 
the AC-group for the 20
th week. However, when we calculate the effect of the 
letter we use the average for the whole experiment period (the reference period 
respectively) and this considerably lowers the variance compared to a single 
week’s figures. In the first column of Table 3 the effect is translated into 
numbers. The calculations show that the letter effect for group AC brings the 
withdrawals down by about 13 percent (13.2 percent when counted in amount 
of SEK and 12.9 percent when counted in days). The effect is statistically 
significant irrespective of confidence level. 
Concerning the effect of the information pamphlet, explaining the rules of 
the VAB-Benefit (the B-group), the results are more uncertain. The point 
estimates, at 4.4 and 3.3 percents increase respectively, compared to the D-
group, indicate that the individuals “discovers” the benefit to some degree. On 
average we thus find no disciplinary effect as a result of only information about 
the benefit. However, the increase in withdrawals in the B-group is far from 
statistically significant on traditional levels. Our conclusion is therefore that the 
experiment does not give a clear cut answer to the pure effect of information. 
In the second column of Table 3 the results from the actual monitoring are 
presented. The withdrawals were checked through contacts with schools/pre-
schools (day care centers) and employer/unemployment benefit funds etc. Even 
though the individuals in the A and C groups had been informed about the 
increased monitoring in advance, we find that both groups, in particular the A 
group, fail to substantial degrees in the monitoring process. In the A-group 11.8 
percent of the paid amounts failed and respectively 11.4 percent of the days 
compensated. For the C-group the corresponding numbers are 6.9 and 7.2 




                                                      
23 Please note that what appears to be a decreased number of withdrawals in the treatment group 
begins already a few weeks before the experiment period. This does not have to be a coincident. 
In Section 5.2 we presented the need of a buffer-month in between the reference period and the 
experiment period. The reason for this is that many people wait for a few weeks before sending 
their claims for the benefit. Thus, we can get a retroactive decrease of withdrawals in the 
treatment group. 
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Table 3. The main results of the study: letter effect, results from monitoring and 
total estimate of overuse. 
   Group  Letter effect 
Failing rate when 
monitored 
































































Note: 95 percent confidence interval in parenthesis. 
 





























Figure 7. VAB-Benefit withdrawn in SEK per individual and week, for the AC-



























Figure 8. Relative difference between weekly withdrawn amount in the AC 
group compared to the D-group ((AC-D)/D) (from week 40/2005 until week 
22/2006). 
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The third column of Table 3 shows the total estimates of excess use. These 
are approximately given by the sum of the estimates in column 2 and 3 in Table 
3. However, these figures are not simply addable since they refer to different 
basic levels of withdrawals. The total estimates of excess use are therefore 
slightly below the sum of the two figures in column 2 and 3 (see Section 6.3 for 
a more elaborate discussion).  
Regardless of whether we measure in amount or in days our estimation of the 
share of withdrawals stemming from excess use is more than 22 percent (22.5 
percent of paid amount and 22.1 percent of the compensated days). These 
numbers indicate that more than a fifth of every withdrawn SEK (or day) was 
unnecessary. Expressed in total SEK these numbers indicate that the Social 
Insurance Agency, with regards to this single benefit, hands out more than 650 
million SEK in one year to recipients not eligible for compensation.
24 
7.2  A closer look at the results of monitoring  
In this section we will present the results of monitoring in greater detail. Table 
4 below shows the total number of individuals, the share of individuals who 
made withdrawals from the benefit during the experiment phase and the 
number of actually monitored individuals in each treatment group. About 17-18 
percent of the individuals included in one of the treatment groups made 
withdrawals from the VAB-Benefit during the experiment period. Among these 
about 30 percent had their withdrawals monitored. The monitoring was carried 
out so that, in each round (three rounds in total), a number of random 
individuals with a positive withdrawal of the benefit during the respective 
period, were selected. Thereafter, every withdrawal made by this individual 
during the sub-period was closely monitored. The monitoring consisted of 
checking against the employer, the child’s attendance in school/pre-school and 
checking for “double payment” from any other benefit system such as 
unemployment benefits etc. The results from the monitoring are presented in 
Table 5 and 6 below.  
From Table 5 it is shown that monitoring, at least in some dimension, has 
been possible in more than 99 percent of the cases selected. As in earlier 
                                                      
24 The whole amount of the benefit turnover was 3.3 billion SEK in the year 2005. However, this 
study only concerns the benefit payments made for children in the ages of 1-11 years old. Data 
from the Swedish Social Insurance Agency for the year 2004 shows that this group accounts for 
more than 90 percent of all withdrawn benefit days. 
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monitoring studies, carried out by the Social Insurance Agency on the VAB-
Benefit, the cases where information from the employer has not been attainable 
is regarded as missing values even if information is attainable from e.g. the 
child’s school. By the same logic the observation is not regarded as missing if 
an answer is possible to get from the employer, even if information regarding 
some other monitoring margin is missing. Among the observations that are not 
regarded as missing, an answer from the school/pre-school has been attainable 
in 87 percent of the cases (see Table 6). 
In Table 7 we present the particular reasons for failure. The most frequent 
reason – 5.9 (AC) and 8.4 (B) percent respectively in the monitored cases – 
was that the child in question had been present in school/pre-school during the 
period when the parent claimed VAB-Benefit. The second most frequent 
reason – 5.9 (AC) and 7.7 (B) percent respectively in the monitored cases – 
was that the parent actually was at work or was salaried during the days or 
hours when she claimed VAB-Benefit. Other causes for failure were that the 
parent was not supposed to be at work during the period, received sick pay (or 
were facing a qualifying day), or in a few cases, was on vacation or received 
unemployment benefits. Examples of “other causes” for failure are that an 
inaccurate yearly work time was reported or the income determining com-
pensation level was incorrect, that the parent received rehabilitation assistance 
or no longer was employed by the stated employer. 
Note that in Table 3 above, the results are presented on the basis of paid 
amount and compensated days, while we in this section present the results in 
terms of whole VAB-Benefit spells. A spell often consists of a number of 
compensated days. For a spell to fail, the whole amount withdrawn need not be 
incorrect; if, for example, an individual has used the benefit during 4 
consecutive days, and the monitoring shows that she only was absent from 
work for 3 days, it is only the amount withdrawn the incorrect day that is 
categorized as excess use (Table 3), while the whole 4-day spell is 
characterized as incorrect in Table 7. 
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Table 4. The number of individuals in the three treatment groups, the number 












A 28  543  17.1  1228 
B    7 051  18.4    322 
C    6 655  18.2    335 
Total 42  249  17.5  1885 
AC 35  198  17.3  1563 
 
 
Table 5. The results of the monitoring. 
Was the VAB-Benefit 
spell correct?  Number of spells Percent 
Percent of cases 
with responses 
No response  15  0.6%   
Yes 1986  84.8%  85.3% 
No 342  14.6%  14.7% 
Total 2343     
 
 
Table 6. Was it possible to receive answers from school/pre-school? 
Response  Number of spells  Percent 
Response possible  2037  86.9% 
Responses not 
possible 189  8.1% 
No information  117  5.0% 
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Table 7. Spells that failed when monitored: group AC and B. 













in group B 
The parent was absent from 
work, while the child was present 
at school/pre-school 
115 5.9  34  8.4 
The parent was at work/received 
salary during the period of the 
VAB-Benefit spell 
115 5.9  31  7.7 
The parent was not supposed to 
be working  
8 0.4 4 1.0 
The parent received sick-pay   7  0.4  1  0.3 
The parent received 
unemployment benefit  
2 0.1 -  - 
The parent was on vacation   -  -  1  0.3 
Other reasons   19  1.0  5  1.2 
Total numbers of failed spells  266  13.7  76  18.8 
Total numbers of monitored 
spells 
1938   405  
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7.3  Did the individuals who received the letters overreact?  
One risk to be concerned with when informing about increased monitoring is 
that the individuals exposed to the information will overreact, i.e. that 
individuals who did not use the benefit excessively decrease their correct use of 
the benefit. As described in Section 0 a number of measures have been taken in 
this experiment in order to reduce the risk of such overreaction. But there is 
still no way to be entirely sure that there is no substantial overreaction, why 
this subsection is devoted to gathering evidence on the seriousness of the 
problem in this particular study.  
The schools and pre-schools do not usually admit sick children, due to the 
risk of infection as well as the increased workload. Since the sickness status of 
the child is an often binding constraint, a parent who overreacts to the letter 
must often find a substitute caretaker. An obvious candidate is the partner, 
since the letter is very clear on that it is only “Your” individual use of the 
VAB-Benefit that will be subject to increased monitoring. Even if grandparents 
who are no longer working could step in, the partner must in many cases be the 
most obvious choice. Since we have data on the partners, we can examine 
whether an overreaction is at hand by studying the implicit reaction of the 
partner of the ones exposed to the treatment (in particular group A and C). 
Since the effect on the partner is likely to be larger if the two caretakers 
actually live together we try to limit the sample to the traditional nuclear 
family. How this was done was described in the data section (Section 5.1). 
The figures below (Figure 9 and 10) illustrate the qualitative results. The 
group of people that is indirectly treated, i.e. whose partner was in the AC 
group, is denoted the DAC group. Furthermore we denote the new remaining 
population as the DD group. Figure 9 shows that the difference between the 
withdrawals in the DD and the DAC group is very modest. 
In Table 8 the graphic analysis has been transferred into numbers. Note first 
that the effect of the letter among the “families” is not particularly different 
from the treatment effect in the full population. In the AC group we estimate an 
effect of the letter at -13.7 percent, which should be compared to an effect of -
13.2 percent in the full population. The effect of only sending out an 
informative brochure (group B), is positive in the “family”- population as well, 
and somewhat higher compared with the total population. The effect in group 
B, however, is still not statistically different from zero. 






























Figure 9. Withdrawal amount of VAB-Benefit in SEK per individual and week 
(from week 40/2005 until week 22/2006), divided into the AC group, the DAC 
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Figure 10. Relative difference between weekly withdrawn amount in the AC 
group, and the DAC group, compared to the DD-group ((AC-DD)/DD and 
(DAC-DD)/DD) (from week 40/2005 until week 22/2006). 
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Table 8. The letter effect on the receiver and its partner. 

















Note: 95 percent confidence interval in parenthesis. 
 
If we instead examine how the partner reacts to the letter, we find no sign of 
substitution effect. The measured partner effect of the letter in group A and C 
are decreased withdrawals by about 2.5 percent, while the partner effect in the 
B group is an increase of 2.6 percent. However, these results are highly 
insignificant.  
Even if the major part of the potential overreacting families would use 
another substitute than the partner (friend, relatives, parents or letting the sick 
child attend school/pre-school), we would at least expect a minor increase in 
the partners use of the benefit. However, if there are two counteracting effects, 
one substitution and one disciplinary (if some interpret the letter as the whole 
family being monitored) we can get a net result that does not show any effect in 
aggregate. It is principally possible that what we measure is the sum of a 
positive effect (when you let the partner take care of the sick child) and a 
negative contamination effect (the disciplinary effect contaminates the partner). 
However, two counteracting effects tend to increase the variance of the variable 
in question. A comparison of the distribution of the differences in paid amount 
between the AC group and the D group does not show such pattern. All this 
taken into consideration, we feel safe to conclude that, in this particular study, 
there is not a substantial problem with overreaction in response to the letters.  
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7.4  The effects on different subgroups 
An important purpose of this study is to separate different subgroups that are 
particularly prone to excess use of the VAB-Benefit. To this purpose we here 
present the results for a number of different subgroups. 
There are two reasons why the results in this section should be interpreted 
with caution. Firstly, the statistical certainty of an estimate decreases generally 
as the group we are studying gets smaller. Secondly, the results cannot be 
interpreted as direct causal effects. A simple example illustrates the logic. 
Assume that we find individuals living in region X particularly prone to excess 
use of the benefit. In this kind of partial analysis we will not answer the, more 
ambitious, question about what quality of the inhabitants in region X that 
causes this behavior. It can possibly depend on a number of factors such as age 
structure, distribution of incomes, educational level or the labor market in the 
region. Thus, we cannot conclude that an individual, given the other 
characteristics (gender, age, income etc.) can be expected to be more inclined 
to excess use, just because she lives in region X. 
We confine our presentation to cover only groups based on gender, sector, 
educational level, region, age and income. We find only very small differences 
between excess use measured in compensated days and amount. For simplicity 
we will therefore limit the presentation to only the results measured in 
withdrawn amount. Furthermore, only the results of the main treatment group, 
AC, will be presented. 
The results in this section can be summarized with two main findings. 
Firstly, we find significant differences between the sexes; men engage in 
excess use to a higher extent than women. This should be interpreted in the 
sense that a given amount of benefit paid out to a man is likelier to stem from 
excess use, than if it was paid out to a woman. Secondly, we find that excess 
use decreases with education level. The estimates for each category are 
presented in Table 9.  
7.4.1  Gender 
Excess use of the benefit by men is estimated to 28 percent of the amount 
withdrawn by men, while the same measure for women is about 19 percent. 
The difference is statistically significant. As also shown in the table, practically 
the whole difference stems from men reacting stronger to the letter; the effect 
of the letter is about twice as big for men than for women. 
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Table 9. Subgroup results. 




of excess use 
Gender        
Men -18.9% [2.9%]  11.3% [1.5%]  28.0% [2.8%] 
Women -9.5% [2.1%]  10.3% [1.0%]  18.9% [2.1%] 
Sector        
Private -15.2% [2.2%]  11.1% [1.0%]  24.6% [2.2%] 
Public -11.0% [2.8%]  9.1% [1.5%]  19.2% [2.8%] 
Education level        
Compulsory school  -27.9% [6.5%]  18.7% [3.8%]  41.3% [6.0%] 
High-school -18.7% [2.3%]  9.8% [1.0%]  26.7% [2.3%] 
Post high-school  -1.4% [2.7%]  9.9% [1.3%]  11.2% [2.8%] 
Region        
Metropolitan area  -12.4% [2.7%]  14.4% [1.3%]  25.0% [2.6%] 
Major population centre  -14.1% [2.9%]  7.4% [1.1%]  20.5% [2.8%] 
Rural area  -12.9% [3.4%]  8.5% [1.9%]  20.2% [3.5%] 
Age        
- 33  -13.3% [3.0%]  9.2% [1.3%]  21.2% [2.9%] 
34 - 37  -11.5% [3.2%]  11.7% [1.7%]  21.9% [3.2%] 
38 - 41  -18.4% [3.6%]  10.7% [1.8%]  27.1% [3.5%] 
42 -  -8.7% [4.2%]  11.7% [1.8%]  19.4% [4.0%] 
Income group        
Men below median  -16.7% [4.0%]  10.6% [1.8%]  25.5% [3.9%] 
Men above median  -21.0% [4.2%]  11.9% [2.2%]  30.4% [4.1%] 
Women below median  -12.2% [3.1%]  9.0% [1.4%]  20.1% [3.1%] 
Women above median  -7.5% [2.8%]  11.2% [1.3%]  17.9% [2.8%] 
Note: Standard errors in parenthesis. 
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7.4.2  Sector 
When studying how excess use differs between individuals in private and 
public sector, no statistically significant results are found. The tendency, based 
on the point estimates, is that individuals in the private sector have a higher 
level of excess use than people in the public sector: 24.6 percent compared to 
19.2 percent. Most of the difference stems from the effect of the letter. The 
sectoral affiliation is determined by the sector in which the individual draw the 
main income during 2004. 
7.4.3  Level of education 
When dividing the population into different educational categories we find that 
the excess use decreases with level of education. In the group with only nine-
year compulsory school the excess use is estimated to 41.3 percent, while the 
corresponding number for the group with at most high-school education is 26.7 
percent. However, the group with the lowest education level is relatively small, 
both in numbers of individuals as well as in share of withdrawals. When 
turning to the excess use of the group with the highest education, post high-
school, we find a substantial decrease in excess use. The excess use is 
estimated to 11.2 percent in the group with the highest education. All three 
estimates are significantly different from each other. 
7.4.4  Region 
When it comes to regional differences, the pattern is more ambiguous. We find 
no significant differences between the three different regional types: big 
cities
25, major population centers
26 and others. The point estimates indicate that 
excess use of the benefit is highest in the big cities and lowest in major 
population centers, but there are no statistically significant differences. 
                                                      
25 Refers to Stockholm/Södertälje A-region, Göteborg A-region and Malmö/Lund/Trelleborg A-
region – see Statistics Sweden (SCB) (2003). 
26 Refers to the Statistics Sweden classification of rural districts in H-regions. Medium-sized 
cities are rural districts with more than 90 000 inhabitant within 30 kilometre radius from the 
city’s centre (See SCB, 2003). 
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7.4.5  Age 
The variation in excess use over different age categories is not clear cut. There 
is a tendency to a reversed U-shape, i.e. lower excess use among the youngest 
and oldest and a bit higher in the middle. The heterogeneity in the estimates 
stems from the effect of the letter. The highest response, 18.4 percent is 
obtained in the age groups of 38-41 years old, and the smallest response, 8.7 
percent is found in the age group of 42 years and older. However, there are no 
significant differences in the total estimates of excess use. 
7.4.6  Income 
Since income represents a variable with considerable gender differences, we 
found it appropriate to do separate income analysis. We thus classify women 
and men separately as high- and low income earners. Men with an income over 
the average are classified as high income earners and the remaining men as low 
income earners. Women are classified correspondingly. The income year used 
is the taxed earnings in 2004. 
The reactions to the letter is relative disparate. The strongest reaction, 
estimated to 21.0 percent, is obtained from men with high income. Women 
with high incomes show the weakest reaction to the letter; they decrease their 
withdrawals by 7.5 percent due to the letter. 
The tendency for the total estimates of excess use is that men who are high 
income earners have a higher estimate of excess use than low income men. The 
inverted pattern is obtained for women; women with high incomes have a 
lower estimate of excess use than low income women have. However, no 
comparisons within the separate sexes are statistically significant. The ten-
dencies regarding incomes should therefore be interpreted with great caution. 
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8  Summary 
To measure the excess use of the VAB-Benefit (a benefit for staying home 
from work with a sick child), we have here used a relatively new method, the 
information method. As a complement to the traditional random monitoring 
approach, some individuals are notified in advance that they are to be exposed 
to intensified monitoring. Those individuals were randomly chosen from the 
population eligible for the benefit. When an individual receive notice that his or 
her future (potential) withdrawal of the benefit will be subject to intensified 
monitoring, we expect this person to decrease his or her potential excess use of 
the benefit. In essence, the potential decrease in benefit withdrawal, caused by 
the letter, is through aggregation interpreted as excess use. Moreover, the actual 
monitoring is executed, as promised in the letter, which adds an additional 
component to the estimate of total excess use. 
The study shows that the excess use of the VAB-Benefit is far more 
substantial than earlier studies have shown. In earlier studies of this benefit, 
carried out by the Social Insurance Agency, it was found that about 6-10 
percent of the total withdrawn amount could be attributed to excess use. We 
estimate that the excess use amounts to 22.5 percent of the total withdrawn 
amount. This point estimate implies that more than 650 million SEK yearly are 
unnecessarily paid out through this benefit alone. 
We also find that men engage in excess use of the benefit to a larger extent 
than women do; the estimates are 28 percent for men and 19 percent for 
women. According to these estimates the risk of a given VAB-Benefit krona to 
stem from excess use is about 50 percent higher if it is withdrawn by a man 
than by a woman. Expressed as share of the total VAB-Benefit payments this 
gender difference is, however, neutralized, due to the fact that women use the 
benefit to a larger extent than men do. We find that approximately the same 
share of the total VAB-Benefit kronor, stemming from excess use, are 
withdrawn by men and women. 
Since monitoring can never be a hundred percent reliable – there are always 
ways to engage in excess use of a benefit that is impossible, for all practical 
purposes, to discover – estimates based on random monitoring have an intrinsic 
tendency to underestimate the excess use. The information method offers a 
potential alternative. Since this method is partly also based on the individuals 
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own response to knowledge of increased monitoring, we may capture a larger 
part of the general excess use of the benefit. This study has therefore arrived at 
substantially larger estimates of excess use than earlier studies have. A further 
reason why this study arrives at higher figures than before is that, for the first 
time, monitoring through contacts with the children’s schools/pre-schools has 
been executed extensively; according to the rules of the benefit, the child 
(obviously) has to be home from school/pre-school when the caretaker uses the 
benefit. In earlier studies of the benefit, this margin has not been monitored 
extensively. We find that many withdrawals fail due to this particular margin, 
i.e. many withdrawals have been made when the child actually was attending 
school/pre-school. One additional important aspect, that distinguishes the 
monitoring process in this study from earlier studies, is that there has elapsed a 
considerably shorter time between the withdrawal and the actual monitoring; it 
is very reasonable to assume that the quality of the monitoring increases as this 
time-span decreases. 
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Appendix 1: The letter to treatment 
group A and C 
Monitoring of temporary parental benefit  
 
You have been selected for special monitoring concerning temporary parental 
benefit. The monitoring concerns claims and compensations for temporary 
parental benefit during the period of the 29
th of March to the 30
th of May 2006. 
The Swedish Social Insurance Agency is going to carry out inspections by e.g. 
contacting employers, day care and schools. 
 
The fact that you have been selected has nothing to do with earlier withdrawals 
of temporary parental benefit. You may not necessarily have applied for 
temporary parental benefit in the past. We have used a method of random 
selection. The reason for You being selected is thus not that you are suspected 
of cheating. It is equally probable for all having children in the ages of 1-11 to 
be selected for intensified monitoring. 
     
The increased inspection represents a part of a bigger work to counteract 
cheating and offences against public compensations. 
 
If you have questions on this, please feel free to contact us. Please use our e-
mailbox: kontroll.tfp@forsakringskassan.se. If you prefer to talk to us, the 
phone number is 020 – 45 00 56. 
     
If you wish to learn more about the Swedish Social Insurance Agency and 
temporary parental benefit, you may visit our web site, 
www.forsakringskassan.se. 
     
The Swedish Social Insurance Agency 
Försäkringskassan 
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Appendix 2: Information letter to the 
treatment group B 
Information to you who have children in the age of  
1 to 11 
 
As a way to secure that the correct compensation is paid to the right individual 
for the right occasion, the social insurance sends out information on care for 
sick child compensation (VAB). The reason that you receive this information is 
that you have children (child) in these ages.  
 
In the attached leaflet you can read about the rules you have to fulfill to being 
eligible for compensation.  
 
The leaflet gives information on the VAB benefit, but should not be regarded 
as words of an act. If you wish to learn more you may get into contact with the 
Social Insurance Agency or visit our web site, www.forsakringskassan.se. 
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Appendix 3: The information on the 
regulations sent out to Group A and B 
Temporary parental benefit, care for sick child 
The right to care for sick child compensation  
You, who have children in the ages below 12, are eligible to the VAB-Benefit. Besides 
biological parents, also adoptive parents are affected by this, as well as: 
• A person living together with the parent 
• A person who by admission of the social welfare board takes care of a child for the 
purpose of adopting it. 
• A juridical caretaker who, without being a parent for the child have custody of the 
same. 
• A person who takes care of a child permanently in his or her home (foster parent). 
• Individuals living together and are or have been married or have had joint children. 
Under what circumstances are you eligible to VAB-Benefit?  
VAB-Benefit may be paid out to the parent who has to be absent from work to take 
care of a sick child in the home for any of the following reasons: 
• The child is ill or infectious. 
• The regular caretaker is ill or infectious. The regular caretaker is the person who 
usually takes care of the child when you are working, such as a parent working in 
the home, the other parent, child minder or relative. 
• The other parent has to visit the doctor with another child of the family. The 
condition is that the child is under the age of 12 and in some cases under the age of 
16.  
• To visit the child welfare centre or the public preventive medicine care, such as the 
dentist or children’s psychiatry and youth welfare. 
VAB-Benefit can also be paid when a parent to a sick child or a child with a functional 
disorder visits an institution, such as rehabilitation, special school or alike or attend a 
course arranged by hospital staff. If care allowance has been paid for the child, VAB-
Benefit would not be paid for the same treatment and supervision. 
Certificate for the child 
If the child is sick/ill infectious for more than 7 days a certificate from the doctor or 
nurse will be needed from the 8
th day. The first day is counted from the first day 
compensated for care taking. Also the days when you don’t receive benefit will be 
counted to the first unattested 7 days. The calculation of the period when no 
certification is needed would not be affected by the parents for instance replacing each 
other in the care taking of the child.  
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For the regular caretaker 
If the regular caretaker is ill this would be confirmed through a certificate or stated 
opinion from a doctor from the 8
th day.  
Number of compensation days  
The parents can be compensated during maximum 60 days per child and year. When 
these 60 days are exhausted, compensation can be paid for additional maximum 60 
days per child and year. The additional 60 days cannot be claimed due to the regular 
caretakers illness or infectiousness. 
Compensation to another person when the parent is working  
The right to VAB-Benefit can be signed over to another person, who, in the parents 
place, stays home from work to take care of the child. This means that the parent 
continues to work and that another insured is absent work in order to take care of the 
child (in the caretakers place). The right to VAB-Benefit can be signed over when the 
child is sick or infectious or when the regular caretaker, for example the child minder, 
is sick or infectious. 
Compensation to another person – when the parent falls ill 
When a parent is ill and receives sick pay or sickness benefit the Social Insurance 
Agency can decide that another person, who is absent from work in order to take care 
of someone else’s sick child, can receive VAB-Benefit compensation (in the parents 
place). That is to say that if you were well and would have been eligible to the VAB-
Benefit in the claim for benefit in the situation it concerns. VAB-Benefit with regards 
to children younger than 240 days can only be paid if the child is hospitalized or when 
the supervision of the child is permanently arranged in day care and you as a parent has 
to stay at home from your work in order to take care of the child. VAB-Benefit can also 
be paid when the child is in the final phase of a care period and is nursed in the home if 
the alternative would be continuous hospital treatment. 
Exchange of parental benefit into VAB-Benefit  
If the child is taken care of in a hospital, parental benefit can be e exchanged for VAB-
Benefit. This also applies both for the child it concerns as well as older siblings. 
Special needs 
In some cases VAB-Benefit can be paid for a sick or disabled child who’s younger than 
240 days. This applies among others to when a parent visits an institution, for example 
rehabilitation, special school or alike, or attends a course arranged by a medical 
institution. The same applies for children 240 days or older when the parent exchanges 
parental benefit to VAB-Benefit. 
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Compensation 
The VAB-Benefit is 80 percent of the sickness benefit based income. The 
compensation can be withdrawn for a whole, three quarters, a half, one quarter or one 
eighth of a day. A day with three quarter, a half, one quarter or one eighth 
compensation is counted as corresponding share of a day. If you are employed, you 
receive hour- or day based compensation, i.e. 80 percent of the sickness benefit based 
income divided by the work in one year expressed in hours or days. If you collect 
income from other type of employment you will receive calendar day calculated 
compensation, i.e. 80 percent of the sickness benefit based income divided by 365. This 
applies even if you exchange parental benefit to VAB-Benefit. Your compensation is 
calendar day calculated also for a day when you are wholly or partially unemployed. If 
you are wholly unemployed you receive compensation only for days when you loose 
jobseeker's allowance. 
Application 
You have to make an application to the Social Insurance Agency on at latest the very 
same day you wish to begin the period of compensation. You can also apply for the 
benefit at the web www.forsakringskassan.se, service phone 020-524 524 or phone 
your insurance office. Some employers automatically file an application for you. It is 
therefore important that you learn how this is done at your work place. 
More information 
This folder shall not be regarded as words of an act in this matter. If you want to learn 
more about the VAB-Benefit and the parental insurance you may visit our web site 
www.forsakringskassan.se, or get into touch with the Social Insurance Agency. 
Obligations 
What happens when you receive too much in compensation? 
If you receives compensation that you’re not eligible to, you will normally have to pay 
pack the incorrect sum. This implies even if it’s not your fault that the compensation 
was incorrect. 
It is felonious to cheat 
At the Social Insurance Agency we regard the matter of cheating seriously. By 
“cheating” we mean that someone deliberately tries to get round the rules in order to 
get hold of compensation. What happens when you cheat, for example by reporting 
incorrect information or by neglect reporting changed conditions? Well, the one who is 
cheating always will be hold accountable and held responsible and furthermore runs the 
risk of being punished by paying fine or to serve jail time. 
Always report changes 
You are always obliged to report changed conditions significant for the eligibility to 
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